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An Insufficiently Accountable
Presidency: Some Reflections on
Jack Goldsmith’s Power and
Constraint
Baher Azmy *
In his insightful and highly readable new book, Power and
Constraint, Jack Goldsmith argues that contrary to popular
perception, executive branch activity in our enduring, post-9/11
era has been adequately constrained by a range of novel forces
such human rights groups, government lawyers and journalists
and that such constraints have, in turn, produced a public and
political consensus that the current balance between national
security policies and civil and human rights is “legitimate.”
This review takes issue with Goldsmith’s perspective on the
capacity of the entities he praises to meaningfully check wartime Executive Branch practices and contests Goldsmith’s
methodologically flawed attempt to transform his positivist
description of the way things are into a normative conclusion
that this is the way things ought to be in our constitutional
system.
This review also identifies a perceptible bias in
Goldsmith’s analysis that heavily preferences an aggressive
national security regime, while discounting harms to the victims
of that regime’s excesses, and argues that Goldsmith
undervalues important metrics of accountability that should
cause us to doubt seriously that we have a properly constrained
the presidency or that our current state of affairs is
constitutionally legitimate.
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I.

Introduction

Case Western Reserve University School of Law has
understandably chosen to recognize Jack Goldsmith’s latest book,
Power and Constraint: The Accountable Presidency After 9/11, 1 as
part of this year’s Frederick K. Cox International Law Center War
Crimes Symposium. It is a thoughtful and very readable account of
the dynamic political, legal, and military forces that shaped and
ultimately limited executive-branch policy making around a host of
asserted war-making activities such as targeting, detention, and
surveillance in the tumultuous decade following 9/11.
Goldsmith’s project and his perspective are optimistic, some
would even say Panglossian. 2 He seeks to demonstrate that, despite
depictions of lawlessness, secrecy, and cruelty associated with
counterterrorism policies of the past decade—and primarily occurring
in George W. Bush’s first term—the executive branch has in fact
come to be meaningfully constrained by a complex, inter-related, and
decidedly modern set of mechanisms. Those mechanisms have made
the commander-in-chief democratically accountable and subject to a
system of checks and balances that, while different from the structural
ones contemplated by James Madison, are equally effective in limiting
executive branch transgressions throughout what may well be an
1.

JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE
PRESIDENCY AFTER 9/11 (2012).

2.

See Jonathan Hafetz, American Exceptionalism (or “The Best of All
Possible Worlds”), BALKINIZATION BLOG (Apr. 2, 2012), http://balkin.
blogspot.com/2012/04/american-exceptionalism-or-best-of-all.html.
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endless war. Goldsmith’s provocative thesis—supported as it is, by
first-person interviews from a variety of participants on all sides of
the decade’s legal drama and benefitting from some temporal distance
from key events—will surely populate syllabi addressing the post-9/11
legal landscape for years to come, alongside other important and
decidedly less sanguine works that have excoriated the YooAddington-Cheney legal paradigm that operated in the early-tomiddle years of the Bush Administration. 3
As readable as Goldsmith’s account is, however, it suffers from
notable methodological flaws and ultimately comes to a highly
contestable substantive judgment about the virtue of the present state
of affairs. These facets of his analysis appear to be driven by a
significant bias that preferences American exceptionalism and might
over the substantial human suffering caused by those same forces. On
the methodological side, Goldsmith’s analysis falls into a basic
philosophical trap, the “is-ought problem” (also known as “Hume’s
Law”). 4 That is, Goldsmith appears to make normative judgments
about how the world of accountability ought to be, from largely
positivist premises about the way the world is; he labels, it seems, this
determinist account of the current state of affairs as “legitimate.” His
normative conclusion—that, in effect, this is the best of all possible
worlds—does not follow from his positivist (and too rosy, in my view)
depiction of the status quo. Indeed, it is undermined by some striking
3.

For just the slimmest sampling of this perspective, see, e.g., JANE
MAYER, THE DARK SIDE: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW THE WAR ON
TERROR TURNED INTO A WAR ON AMERICAN IDEALS (2008); JOE
MARGULIES, GUANTANAMO AND THE ABUSE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER
(2006); CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAKEOVER: THE RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL
PRESIDENCY AND THE SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2008);
ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, THE IDEA THAT IS AMERICA: KEEPING FAITH
WITH OUR VALUES IN A DANGEROUS WORLD (2007); TIM WEINER,
LEGACY OF ASHES: A HISTORY OF THE CIA (2008); JAMES RISEN, STATE
OF WAR: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE CIA AND THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION (2006); JONATHAN HAFETZ, HABEAS CORPUS AFTER
9/11 (2011); FREDERICK A.O. SCHWARTZ & AZIZ HUQ, UNCHECKED AND
UNBALANCED: PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN A TIME OF TERROR (2008);
BARTON GELLMAN, ANGLER: THE CHENEY VICE PRESIDENCY (2008); RON
SUSKIND, THE ONE PERCENT DOCTRINE: DEEP INSIDE AMERICA’S PURSUIT
OF ITS ENEMIES SINCE 9/11 (2006); MARK DANNER, TORTURE AND
TRUTH: AMERICA, ABU GHRAIB, AND THE WAR ON TERROR (2004); THE
TORTURE DEBATE IN AMERICA (Karen Greenberg ed., 2005); ALFRED W.
MCCOY, A QUESTION OF TORTURE: CIA INTERROGATION FROM THE COLD
WAR TO THE WAR ON TERROR (2006); DARIUS REJALI, TORTURE AND
DEMOCRACY (2009); DAVID D. COLE & JAMES X. DEMPSEY, TERRORISM
AND THE CONSTITUTION: SACRIFICING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE NAME OF
NATIONAL SECURITY (2006); DAVID D. COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE
STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON
TERRORISM (2005).

4.

See DAVID HUME, TREATISE ON HUMAN NATURE (1776).
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statements that bespeak a failure to fairly evaluate the competing
interests at stake. For example, he regards the ethics investigation
into John Yoo’s instrumentalist memos authorizing torture as
“brutal,” saying nothing about the actual brutality of the
interrogations and violence Yoo ratified.5 To take another, he
credulously asserts that all of the remaining Guantanamo detainees
are the “worst of the worst” “terrorist soldiers,”6 a claim that is so
sloppy and manifestly false,7 it would appear to call into question the
balance of his entire legitimacy analysis.
However, having identified what I believe is a perceptible bias in
his perspective, I must make a full disclosure of my own. I am a longstanding member of the Guantanamo Bay Bar Association, the
collection of thousands pro bono attorneys described in Goldsmith’s
book, who have represented hundreds of Guantanamo detainees in
habeas proceedings following the Supreme Court’s decision in Rasul v.
Bush.8 And I have recently assumed the role of Legal Director of the
Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR), a human rights litigation
and advocacy organization Goldsmith places at the center of the legal
battles seeking access to justice for Guantanamo detainees and
accountability for torture and human rights abuses committed by
U.S. officials in connection with the Bush Administration’s “war on
terror.” Goldsmith credits CCR president and leading human rights
lawyer, Michael Ratner, for filing the first habeas cases in 2002
challenging the legality of the Guantanamo detentions, when few
5.

See GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 110.

6.

See, e.g., id. at 231.

7.

See, e.g., Peter Finn, Guantanamo Detainees Cleared for Release but
Left in Limbo, WASH. POST, Dec. 8, 2011, http://articles.wash
ingtonpost.com/2011-11-08/national/35282416_1_guantanamodetainees-guantanamo-bay-home-nations (reporting that the Obama
Administration cleared 126 men for transfer from Guantanamo after a
comprehensive review about their dangerousness and detainability); see
also Guantanamo by the Numbers, CTR. FOR CONST. RTS, http://
ccrjustice.org/learn-more/faqs/guantanamo-numbers-what-you-shouldknow-and-do-about-guantanamo (last visited Feb. 18 2013) (noting that
86 of the 166 remaining men at Guantanamo have been cleared for
transfer); Michael Mone, Jr., Opinion, Wait Continues for Cleared
Guantanamo Detainees, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 17, 2013, http://www.
bostonglobe.com/opinion/2013/02/17/wait-continues-for-cleared-guanta
namo-detainees/ZVAjgvfz40i5ZRJpYD0CcP/story.html (telling story of
thirty- year-old Syrian detainee who has been cleared for transfer from
Guantanamo); Wells Dixon, President Obama Must Veto Defense Bill to
Close Gitmo, THE HILL, Dec. 20, 2012, http://thehill.com/blogs/congr
ess-blog/homeland-security/273849-president-obama-must-veto-defensebill-to-close-gitmo (telling story of Djamel Ameziane, an innocent
detainee who has been cleared for transfer by the Bush and Obama
Administrations but still languishes in Guantanamo).

8.

542 U.S. 466 (2004).
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others dared take on such an unpopular cause. 9 But Goldsmith also
contends that the litigation not only failed to achieve its initial
aims—i.e., ending indefinite, preventive detention—the litigation
actually set in motion a series of judicial decisions and executive
actions that ultimately legitimated these policies under the law and
popular perception.
Of the many facets of Goldsmith’s account, this is the one I am
most interested in, and not just because it surely has a sting to it.
After all, no human rights lawyer wants to hear that she has solidified
or validated the very system she finds immoral and dedicated her life
to changing. Still, putting aside the literary allure of the “be-carefulwhat-you-wish-for” trope, Goldsmith’s characterization of the state of
the world today is neither entirely accurate nor fair. In what follows, I
first intend to demonstrate that this facet of his book’s conclusion—
that various aspects of U.S. counterterrorism policy (especially around
detention, targeting and surveillance) now have legal legitimacy—
suffers from some significant methodological flaws: the empirical
foundation for his claim of “legitimacy” is uncertain, at best. After
spending a little more time questioning Goldsmith’s perspective, I
then seek to show that the system of “accountability” that Goldsmith
endorses remains fundamentally unjust and will be judged so by
important criteria that Goldsmith undervalues. Finally, I suggest
Goldsmith’s policy recommendation for a robust executive national
security paradigm may produce a paradox that would sting far more
harshly than the one Goldsmith attributes to CCR’s work.

II. A Rosy Presidential Synopticon
Goldsmith posits that we have developed a healthy system of
presidential accountability—a push and pull equilibrium in which
various actors inside and outside of the government (e.g., journalists,
whistleblowers, government agency Inspectors General, military
lawyers, human rights NGOs), responded to the extra-legal actions of
the first-term Bush Administration and exposed, litigated, publicized,
and ultimately forced a change in the worst executive-branch
practices related to things such as incommunicado detention,
extraordinary rendition, secret CIA prisons, and torture. 10 He catalogs
the ways in which these actors played a meaningful part in
supplementing and energizing the role of traditional institutions—the
courts and Congress—in checking extra-legal Bush Administration
activities, 11 even as he gives some of these actors more credit than
9.

See GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 161–201 (detailing the efforts of the
Guantanamo Bar Association, spearheaded by CCR and Michael
Ratner).

10.

Id. at xi.

11.

See, e.g., id. at 209.
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they probably themselves believe they deserve. He regards their
modest successes as particularly novel and noteworthy in light of the
traditional deference given to the president during times of crisis.
What seems most important to Goldsmith is that the cumulative
response of these actors to emergency actions of the Bush
Administration—the “ecology of transparency” 12 they created—is
actually durable and sustainable. These actors can, and should, in his
view, remain in place to scrutinize and constrain future executive
wartime practices. Goldsmith believes that these forces have inverted
the traditional assumptions regarding the awesome and intimidating
power of the state, including its consistent capacity to surveil and
control its citizens. 13 Instead of (or at least in addition to) a
Benthamite, state-created panopticon, a device in which one can
monitor many, Goldsmith believes we live in a synopticon, in which
these many actors can consistently monitor and control one: the
presidency. For Goldsmith, this dynamic produces a happy stasis of
presidential power checked by presidential accountability, where the
president can do just enough to robustly pursue national security
policy, bolstered by a legitimacy that comes from persistent legal
scrutiny.
In subsequent sections of this essay, I offer some normative
critiques of what I believe to be Goldsmith’s overly optimistic model.
In the meantime, it is worth briefly considering the role he ascribes to
some of the key actors, both to understand the substance of his
argument and to notice the often rosy shading of his perspective.
A. Journalists

Goldsmith observes that “accountability journalism” played a
prominent role in the “ecology of transparency” by exposing deep
secrets about illegal or extra-legal activity of the Bush
Administration. 14 For example, Dana Priest of the Washington Post
(and later Barton Gellman of the same) defied the pleading of
national security officials in the Bush Administration and published
bombshell reports about an archipelago of secret prisons being run by
the CIA in foreign countries. 15 Jane Mayer’s remarkable reporting in

12.

Goldsmith borrows this term from Seth Kriemer. See id. at 118 (citing
Seth Kriemer, The Freedom of Information Act and the Ecology of
Transparency, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1011, 1016 (2008)).

13.

See GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 212 (noting the increased ability of
journalists and others to access government information and documents)

14.

See id. at 51–82.

15.

See id. at 55–56; Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret
Prisons, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/01/AR2005110101644.html; Dana
Priest & Barton Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends
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the New Yorker also highlighted the dubious legality of the Bush
Administration’s “extraordinary rendition” program and torture and
interrogation regimes in Guantanamo and other U.S. prisons,
reporting which culminated in her comprehensive take-down of the
extra-legal paradigm inspired by Dick Cheney’s reference to working
on the “Dark Side.” 16 Likewise, Eric Lichtblau and James Risen
published explosive reports in the New York Times regarding a
massive, secret, warrantless wiretapping program (the “Terrorist
Surveillance Program”) in the United States run by the National
Security Agency. 17
Goldsmith rightly credits Priest’s (and presumably Mayer’s)
reporting with influencing the part of the Supreme Court’s 2006
decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 18 ruling that Common Article 3 of
the Geneva Conventions applied to al-Qaeda suspects and thus
banned “cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment” of individuals
presumably held in these secret prisons. 19 (Much like, as Goldsmith
emphasizes, CBS’s reporting of torture in Abu Ghraib must have
informed the Supreme Court’s decisions in Rasul v. Bush 20 and Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld, 21 to ensure some judicial oversight of executive detention
operations. 22) This, in turn, likely contributed to the Bush
Administration’s decision in 2006 to modify interrogation practices
and move detainees from the CIA prisons into the comparative light
of day at Guantanamo. 23 Goldsmith observes that journalistic exposés
must have depended upon leakers within the government, who were
uncomfortable with executive practices and eager to impose some
constraints themselves. Overall, this reporting contributed eventually
to public disapprobation of the worst of Bush Administration
practices and when combined with the distance from the smoke of

Interrogations, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2002, http://www.washingtonpo
st.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/09/AR2006060901356 .html.
16.

See MAYER, supra note 3, at 9.

17.

See, e.g., James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers
Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/
2005/12/16/politics/16program.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&.

18.

548 U.S. 557 (2008).

19.

See GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 180–81; Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548
U.S. 557, 625–26 (2006).

20.

542 U.S. 466 (2004).

21.

542 U.S. 507 (2004).

22.

See generally Abuse at Abu Gharib, CBS, http://www.cbsnews.com/ele
ments/2004/05/05/iraq/interactivehomemenu615771.shtml (last visited
Feb. 18, 2013).

23.

See GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 56.
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9/11, contributed to the diminishment in the public and the courts of
Cheney’s “Dark Side” paradigm. 24
Goldsmith also finds that the massive disclosure and publication
of government documents by Bradley Manning and Wikileaks is
notable because of the significant technological capacity to copy and
distribute enormous amounts of data: it can happen at the click of a
button, without the laborious page-by-page Xeroxing that Daniel
Ellsberg undertook forty years ago. 25 This, in turn, makes it harder
for the government to conceal secrets. A dynamic Goldsmith appears
to endorse without acknowledging that recent, aggressive crackdowns
on whistleblowers and other Espionage Act prosecutions by the
Obama Administration 26 (not to mention the brutal treatment of
Bradley Manning 27) make this accountability system less sustainable
and less effective than several years earlier. Indeed, in this context,
the hypocritical failure of facets of accountability Goldsmith describes
is evidenced by the government’s prosecution of former CIA official
John Kiraikou for leaking the names of CIA officials involved in the
CIA interrogation program while demurring from any meaningful
investigation or punishment of CIA officials for the creation or
implementation of torture. 28
To be sure, the work of these and other path-breaking journalists
is emblematic of the highest ethical standards and consistent with the
Fourth Estate’s role in our democracy. Still, there are important
reasons to hesitate before crediting modern journalism with providing
as robust a check to executive branch power as Goldsmith suggests.
As Goldsmith concedes in passing, journalists (some from the very
same major papers lauded above) failed in questioning, let alone
preventing, the catastrophic and falsely premised build up to the war

24.

See id. at 57. See also SAVAGE, supra note 3, 154.

25.

See GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 73–79.

26.

See Adam Liptak, A High Tech War on Leaks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11,
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/12/sunday-review/a-high-techwar-on-leaks.html?pagewanted=all (describing series of controversial
prosecutions of leakers of information of public concern); Cora Currier,
Sealing Loose Lips: Charting Obama’s Course on Leaks, PROPUBLICA
(Mar. 9, 2012), http://www.propublica.org/special/sealing-loose-lipscharting-obamas-crackdown-on-national-security-leaks (describing six
prosecutions of leakers or journalists under Espionage Act of 1917,
initiated by the Obama Administration).

27.

See Ashley Frantz, Through Supporters, Bradley Manning Still Fights,
CNN (Aug. 21, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/21/world/bradleymanning-update/index.html (describing the U.S. military’s holding of
Bradley Manning since May 2010).

28.

See Charlie Savage, Former C.I.A. Operative Pleads Guilty in Lead of
Colleague’s Name, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2012, at A6.
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in Iraq. 29 In light of the subsequent mayhem, destruction, and official
incompetence, this was no small oversight. Why this dramatic failure?
In part because, as history teaches us, journalists, like citizens and
court, often get caught up and manipulated by the patriotic push for
war, with its attendant invocations of the American virtue and
exaggerated assertions of harm that would follow absent invasion.
This lasts, as in Vietnam and Iraq, until this narrative is
overwhelmed by facts on the ground. The Bush Administration’s
manipulation of the media in the run-up to the Iraq war should make
us less certain of the ability of journalism to consistently and durably
meet the challenge of checking executive branch misconduct.
Equally important, is the problem Donald Rumsfeld famously
identified as “unknown-unknowns.” 30 Journalists can only publish
what has been leaked to them, and not even the most aggressive
journalist can do anything to expose abuse the government manages
to keep secret. That obvious and overwhelming asymmetry of
information and power necessarily precludes an efficient system of
accountability. This power dynamic also renders Goldsmith’s
assessment about an emerging public consensus or “legitimacy”
around national security policy dubious. 31
B. Government Insider and Outsider Watchdogs

Goldsmith also identifies the development of lawyers inside the
government who serve as Inspectors General within government
agencies or who are appointed by the Justice Department to
undertake special investigations as a piece of his synopticon.
Goldsmith explains that Congress created these offices for the express
purpose of monitoring executive branch activities and then reporting
back to Congress in a speedier and more thorough manner than
Congress could accomplish itself. 32 To Goldsmith, the force of these
internal government watchdogs comes as much from the novelty of
such agency oversight as from the consequences of their actions. For
29.

See GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 56–57 (“The press stumbled badly in
its coverage of the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) rationale for
the 2003 Iraq war.”).

30.

Hillary Profita, Known Knowns, Known Unknowns and Unknown
Unknowns: A Retrospective, CBS (Nov. 9, 2006), http://www.cbsnews.
com/8301-500486_162-2165872-500486.html.

31.

Naturally, journalistic pressure also tends toward publication of stories
that are dramatic and sensational, such as secret CIA detention and
torture centers, as less accolade or reward is lavished on reporters who
develop stories that are less graphic or visceral, such as concerns about
data mining, the PATRIOT Act, or the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court. The results of that incentive structure also produce
significant accountability gaps.

32.

See GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 105.
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example, Goldsmith marvels that CIA Inspector General John
Helgerson was seeking documents and information from CIA officials
actually contemporaneous with their involvement in detention and
interrogation operations and policy making; this kind of intervention
was unprecedented and burdensome. 33 Yet, any surprise over the
assertedly unprecedented scope or force of these investigations should
be moderated when one acknowledges that the CIA’s broad control of
U.S. detention and interrogation operations was itself unprecedented
in the agency’s history. 34 In any event, it is unclear that, other than
forcing CIA officials to bear the pestering inquiries the Inspector
General, the Inspector General or his reporting was responsible for
meaningfully constraining CIA behavior. 35
Goldsmith similarly praises Attorney General Michael Mukasey’s
decision in 2008 to appoint a special Department of Justice
prosecutor, John Durham, to look into the quite narrow question of
whether former CIA Official Jose Rodriguez unlawfully ordered the
destruction of ninety-two videotapes depicting interrogation (and
likely torture) of CIA-detainee Abu Zubaydah. 36 Note, the
investigation was not for purposes of deciding whether Zubaydah (or
others) were tortured in violation our basic commitments to human
rights law, but to examine whether the CIA destroyed evidence in
violation of a more parochial legal duty. In any case, Durham chose
not to bring any criminal charges even related to this narrow inquiry.
Attorney General Eric Holder then commissioned Durham to
investigate whether any CIA officials should be held criminally
responsible for torture or deaths of detainees in U.S. custody. Again,
he declined to prosecute any CIA officials for violation of the criminal

33.

Id. at 109–10.

34.

See WEINER, supra note 3, at 482 (“[T]he CIA [after 9/11] began to
function as a global military police, throwing hundreds of suspects into
secret jails in Afghanistan, Thailand, Poland, and inside the American
military prison in Guantanamo, Cuba. It handed hundreds more
prisoners off to the intelligence services in Egypt, Pakistan, Jordan, and
Syria for interrogations.”).

35.

Goldsmith notes that Helgerson was principled and respected, and that
his work culminated in a comprehensive report in 2004 about the CIA’s
“Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities.” GOLDSMITH,
supra note 1, at 103. He notes that much of the report was actually
laudatory of the CIA, and for criticism, the report merely “documented
some ill-considered or illegal actions that had taken place prior to the
establishment of the CIA’s formal detention and interrogation program,
and explained that many aspects of the program, especially in the early
days, were poorly organized and managed.” Id. at 104. This critique of
CIA behavior does not seem commensurate with CIA wrongdoing and
thus does not appear to me to be a useful example of accountability.

36.

Id. at 111.

32

CaseWestern Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 45·2012
An Insufficiently Accountable Presidency

torture statute, or for the deaths of detainees in CIA custody, 37 even
though it is clear that CIA officials engaged in waterboarding, stress
positions, mock executions, threatening with handguns and power
drills, vowing to kill or rape members of a detainee’s family, and
inducing vomiting, among other horrible things. 38
Goldsmith sees no problem with such a conclusion, which to many
inside and outside the United States appears bewildering and leads to
some considerable cynicism regarding the authenticity, rigor, and
scope of the investigation. 39 Indeed, Goldsmith argues that what
makes the result just and the CIA legitimately “accountable,” is that
CIA officials felt hampered by the investigation and its requirement
37.

Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., Closure of
Investigation into the Interrogation of Certain Detainees (Aug. 30,
2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/August/12-ag1067.html (“Based on the fully developed factual record concerning the
two deaths, the Department has declined prosecution because the
admissible evidence would not be sufficient to obtain and sustain a
conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.”).

38.

See generally C.I.A. Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2012),
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/c/ce
ntral_intelligence_agency/cia_interrogations/index.html.

39.

Human Rights advocate and long-time proponent of accountability for
criminal actors in the Bush Administration, Scott Horton wrote in
response to Attorney General Holder’s announcement that Durham had
exercised prosecutorial discretion in declining to bring charges:
These outcomes should once again focus international attention
on the Justice Department’s conduct. Mandatory provisions of
the Convention Against Torture should have compelled the
department to open criminal inquiries into cases in which
concrete and credible allegations of torture exist. It failed even
to open inquiries in almost all such cases, and in the tiny
handful of cases in which inquiries were opened, Justice
Department figures were busy murmuring assurances from the
outset that these investigations were a mere formality, and that
actual prosecutions were unlikely. So did Durham conduct a
bona fide investigation? We can never know the answer to that
question because everything that Durham did was cloaked—as
proper process in fact requires—in secrecy.
Scott Harper, Holder Announces Impunity for Torutre-Homicides,
HARPERS MAG. ONLINE (Aug. 31, 2012), http://harpers.org/blog/
2012/08/holder-announces-impunity-for-torture-homocides/. Similarly,
Elisa Massimino, the president of Human Rights First, a group that
includes prosecutors, attorneys, and former judges, and which has
published a comprehensive accounting of the CIA torture-murder cases,
responded, “It is hugely disappointing that with ample evidence of
torture, and documented cases of some people actually being tortured to
death, that the Justice Department has not been able to mount a
successful prosecution and hold people responsible for their crimes.”
Scott Shane, No Charges Filed in Two Deaths Involving C.I.A., N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 31, 2012, at A1.
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that they spend hours on the “distracting and psychologically
draining process” of refreshing their memories and digging through
thousands of documents. 40 Administrative burden should not be a
valid metric for government accountability. Indeed, Goldsmith misses
a bigger, more problematic point. Presumably, Durham declined to
prosecute any CIA officials who relied on advice of government
lawyers, such as John Yoo and Jay Bybee, the authors of the the
shameful Torture Memos. But a system in which government lawyers
create objectively implausible legal interpretations to immunize ex
ante, otherwise illegal activity—i.e., to create the proverbial Golden
Shield—is hardly a system that one can plausibly hold up as
accountable.
And, what about Yoo and Bybee, the paradigmatic wrongdoers in
the Bush Administration? A finding by a Justice Department Ethics
Investigator (a kind of Inspector General, which is a mechanism of
accountability lauded by Goldsmith) that Yoo and Bybee committed
legal malpractice in authoring the Torture Memos was overturned by
a Senior Justice Department official on the grounds that the
investigators “themselves had done shoddy work.” 41 Goldsmith is
again comfortable with this seemingly neutered outcome from an
Inspector General, because, “[n]o Justice Department lawyer has ever
been subject to this kind of scrutiny.” 42 The complaint about
unprecedented administrative burden again elides an obvious response
about the unprecedented breach by a Justice Department lawyer.
More importantly, as argued in more detail below, this burden theory
of accountability is a distressingly thin theory of accountability.
Goldsmith adds some strange company to this cast of government
watchdogs: the ACLU. He focuses in particular on Jameel Jaffer’s
genuinely impressive efforts (along with other unmentioned and
talented ACLU lawyers such as Amrit Singh and the lawyers at the
Gibbons PC law firm in New Jersey) to obtain documents related to
Bush Administration torture and interrogation practices, as part of a
massive Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) litigation. As Goldsmith
observes, the litigation forced the government to release, against its
strong will, thousands of embarrassing documents that shed troubling
light on administration torture programs and which, in Goldsmith’s
eyes, “propelled Jameel Jaffer from an unknown and inexperienced
lawyer to a hero of progressive litigation, a man at the vanguard of
the national security bar who used the courts and the FOIA in new
ways to extract the government’s darkest national security secrets.” 43
40.

See GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 111.

41.

Id. at 110.

42.

Id.

43.

Id. at 117.
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But Jaffer himself does not share Goldsmith’s enthusiastic view of
FOIA as a meaningful accountability tool in the national security
context. Jaffer thinks the ACLU was fortunate to draw Judge Alan
Hellerstein of the Southern District of New York on the case.
Furthermore, only a small fraction of the documents the ACLU
sought were actually disclosed and only after literally thousands and
thousands of painstaking hours of effort. 44 Indeed, the Second Circuit
in that case, like so many courts in other national security cases, has
since adopted a highly limited deferential view of the court’s authority
to question executive branch classification decisions. 45
Goldsmith must be well aware of the often Orwellian limitations
of the FOIA mechanism. After all, a federal court in the District of
Columbia has endorsed the CIA’s refusal to acknowledge even the
existence of the very targeted killing program that Goldsmith
discusses in his book. 46 Another district court, in New York Times v.
Department of Justice, 47— a case which sought to obtain disclosure of
legal memoranda justifying the Obama Administration’s targeted
killing program—observed the “Alice-in-Wonderland nature” of the
government’s position in the case. In denying the plaintiffs’ request
for access for the legal justification for targeted killings, the court
explained it felt caught in “a veritable Catch-22,” leaving it “no way
44.

See id.

45.

See, e.g., ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 681 F.3d 61, 75–76 (2d Cir.
2012) (concluding that national security exemption to FOIA justified
government from withholding portions of an OLC memoranda that
revealed, among other things, a picture of CIA detainee and subject of
waterboarding, Abu Zubaydah); see also Wilner v. Nat’l Security
Agency, 592 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2009) (accepting NSA’s “Glomar” response
to FOIA request seeking information about government surveillance of
attorneys representing Guantanamo detainees); Amnesty Int’l USA v.
CIA, 728 F.Supp.2d 479, 511 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (crediting nearly all of
CIA’s claimed national security exemptions to disclosure of information
regarding interrogation, torture and rendition of detainees in CIA
custody); Azmy v. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, 592 F.Supp.2d 590 (S.D.N.Y.
2010) (relating to requests regarding information about released
Guantanamo detainee, accepting Defense Department’s claims of risk to
national security).

46.

See ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 808 F. Supp. 2d 280, 301 (D.D.C.
2011). Goldsmith criticizes the CIA’s Glomar response in this case, more
out of frustration over the selective and strategic leaking by the Obama
Administration about details of its targeting killing program, than
because of a desire for robust judicial review of executive-branch
classification decisions. See Jack Goldsmith, Thoughts on Today’s
Important Drone FOIA Oral Argument in DC Circuit, LAWFARE (Sept.
20, 2012, 6:34 a.m.), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/09/thoughts-ontodays-important-drone-foia-oral-argument-in-dc-circuit/.

47.

New York Times v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., Nos. 11 Civ. 9336(CM), 12 Civ.
794(CM), 2013 WL 50209, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2013).
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around the thicket of laws and precedents that effectively allow the
executive branch of our government to proclaim as perfectly lawful
certain actions that seem on their face incompatible with our
Constitution and laws, while keeping the reasons for its conclusion a
secret.” 48
That Goldsmith is able to look past FOIA’s serious limitations
and still sunnily praise the statute as “a more salient and powerful
accountability tool” 49 that will permit future Jaffers to get at secret
government documents or as a meaningful and durable weapon to
exact national security secrets from the executive branch suggests
Goldsmith maintains a far lower threshold than current and future
Jaffers in evaluating government accountability. In the war for
executive accountability, FOIA is a slingshot attempting to pierce the
tank armor of government secrecy and over-classification.
C. Warrior Lawyers

Goldsmith observes that the military itself (much like every
aspect of our society) has incorporated law and lawyers into nearly
every aspect of its operations, including killing operations. 50 He
explains that, after the embarrassments of the Vietnam era—and
more solidified norms regarding international humanitarian law and
international human rights law, and global public scrutiny of military
wrongdoing—lawyers became an increasingly important part of the
military decision-making process. Goldsmith in particular highlights
the integrated role lawyers have played in military targeting decisions,
in Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan, as those decisions unlike in the
World War II era, are expressly constrained by laws of war. He notes
also that lawyers were involved in developing criteria for individuals
subject to “targeted killing” by drones.
Here, too, Goldsmith may be overemphasizing the significance of
this set of actors in creating a meaningful accountability system.
Indeed, Goldsmith seems to contort a bit to account for the serious
failure of certain lawyers to constrain the worst of Bush
Administration practices in the area of detention and interrogation.
How can this failure be reconciled with his perspective on the positive
influence of government lawyers? All Goldsmith offers on this score is
that, despite all the resources and training poured into ensuring
“lawful action in targeting and in rules of engagement more
generally,” the military “allowed itself to be relatively unprepared for
detention operations.” 51 We know what happened as a result. Put this
48.

Id.

49.

See GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 117.

50.

See id. at 125–60 (discussing the historical development of the role of
lawyers in military operations).

51.

Id. at 147.
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way, this seems a significant concession against his argument. Yet,
there’s a deeper problem. Lawyers of course were involved in
detention decisions and, it is the result of that involvement that we
got torture, incommunicado detention in Guantanamo, and Abu
Ghraib. Office of Legal Counsel lawyers in DOJ wrote memos
recommending that detention operations be located outside the
jurisdiction of the United States, that the Geneva Conventions would
not apply to al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and insurgents in Iraq, and that
universally condemned methods of torture were permissible as a
matter of statutory construction or constitutional law. 52 If the
presence of lawyers in making national security policy is, of itself,
proof of an accountable presidency, how can we account for the very
worst excesses of the Bush Administration, which had the official
sanction of law? In World War II, Franklin Roosevelt and his military
commanders did not need a team of lawyers to believe that the
United States should respect the Geneva Conventions in detaining
Japanese and German soldiers, despite similar ambiguity claimed by
Bush Administration lawyers regarding the Conventions’
applicability. 53 The presence of lawyers does not guarantee legal
legitimacy.
D. The Guantanamo Bar

The most interesting and vexing piece of Goldsmith’s
accountability puzzle is his account of the role played by human
rights groups, which mounted a sustained and in many ways
successful challenge to the Bush Administration’s detention practices
and, in Goldsmith’s view remain trigger ready to push back against
future executive transgressions. The account has a dramatic arc. It
starts with CCR’s president and “left-wing” “radical” lawyer54
Michael Ratner choosing (along with accomplished civil rights lawyer,
Joe Margulies, who regrettably goes unmentioned) to do what no
other human rights group dared to do in 2002: file a habeas corpus
petition on behalf of Shafiq Rasul and other detainees being held
52.

See generally THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB, supra
note 3 (collecting the Torture Memos and providing general
background).

53.

See MARGULIES, supra note 3, at 74–75.

54.

The classification of Michael Ratner of “far-left” and CCR as “radical”
is good for dramatic effect. But fundamentally, there was nothing
politically radical about the case, as the years since its initiation have
borne out, manifested by, among other things, a number of Supreme
Court rulings siding with detainees, and the mass mobilization of
thousands of lawyers into the Guantanamo Bay Bar Association. This
effort sought the application of the most elementary human rights and
constitutional principles in the face of a startling arrogation of executive
power.
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incommunicado in Guantanamo, at a time when emotions from 9/11
were still raw and strong. 55 The administration confidently boasted
that Guantanamo housed only the “worst of the worst,” or among
“the most viscous, best-trained killers on earth.” 56
Goldsmith quotes Ratner’s belief that, at the time it was filed, the
petition had no chance. But that is likely not because, as Goldsmith
himself believes, “[t]he legal precedents, looked at dispassionately, did
not permit Ratner’s clients to go to court.” 57 On the contrary, as the
Court ultimately came to view the question in Rasul and Boumediene,
legal principles do support extending the reach of the great writ to
territories, such as Guantanamo, over which the jailer exercises
control over the prisoner, and where the executive seeks deliberately
to evade the reach of the writ. 58 And, as Ratner believed at time of
filing, the precedent Goldsmith thinks is controlling, the enigmatic
1950 case of Johnson v. Eisentrager, 59 was easily and correctly
distinguished by the Court because the petitioners there were housed
in foreign territory and had already received an opportunity to
challenge the lawfulness of their detention via lengthy military
tribunal. 60 Thus, Ratner was certain he would lose in 2002 primarily
because he is (like Goldsmith is, in this account) a legal realist and
knows that courts cannot always review precedent dispassionately or
politics with a long-term orientation, particularly in the fever of war.
By the time the first enemy combatant cases reached the Court in
2004, however, the detentions at Guantanamo were temporally and
physically removed from the armed conflict in Afghanistan, the Bush
Administration’s unilateralism seemed arrogant and overly-aggressive,
and the specter of a secret prison outside the law seemed incongruent
with a constitutional republic. The fact that, as Goldsmith
documents, so many (non-”radical”) groups came to support, via
amicus briefs, the detainees’ claim to judicial review of their detention
55.

Tom Wilner and his colleagues at the D.C. law office of Shearman and
Sterling also risked their professional reputations in courageously
deciding to represent the families of a number of Kuwaiti detainees and
in filing habeas corpus petitions in early 2002.

56.

Katharine Q. Seelye, Detainees Are Not P.O.W.’s Cheney and Rumsfeld
Declare, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2002, at A6 (quoting Dick Cheney and
Donald Rumsfeld).

57.

GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 164.

58.

See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 481, 484 (2004); Boumediene v. Bush,
553 U.S. 723, 795 (2008).

59.

339 U.S. 763 (1950).

60.

See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 476; id. at 487 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also
Baher Azmy, Rasul v. Bush and the Intraterritorial Constitution, 62
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. LAW 369, 381–84 (2007) (discussing the legal
status of Guantanamo Bay).
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in Rasul—groups such as retired generals, diplomats and judges,
former prisoners-of-war, hundreds of UK Parliamentarians, a
collection of JAG officers, an impressive array of domestic and
international human rights organizations, and the iconic Fred
Korematsu himself—suggests how dramatically lawless the
administration’s position seemed to be. 61 The Court’s seemingly
minimalist response in Rasul to grant detainees statutory habeas
rights, packed great symbolic force, by pulling the executive in line
with basic, American legal values. As Goldsmith describes, “[t]he
presidency was untrustworthy, out of control, and defying the rule of
law and military tradition.” 62
But this is just a pit stop in the course of the legal drama
Goldsmith narrates. In short, the victories in Rasul, Hamdi, and later
Hamdan, were supported by and further energized a massive network
of coordinated human rights activists (foreign and domestic),
journalists, military lawyers, and the private bar, to press for
meaningful rights for detainees. Of particular note is the so-called
Guantanamo Bar Association, made up of thousands of pro bono
attorneys from the biggest and smallest law firms, the legal academy,
public interest organizations, and federal public defender offices,
which took on individual representation of hundreds of detainees and
transformed Ratner’s “radical” litigation into a decidedly mainstream
one, at the heart of the rule of law. 63 Their coordinated efforts were
enough to expose monumental human suffering, 64 unfairness, and
bureaucratic incompetence, 65 wrestle freedom for hundreds of
detainees (through pressure and advocacy, not through any court
order), 66 to overcome congressional efforts to restrict habeas rights via
the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 and the Military Commissions
61.

See GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 170–75 (discussing Fred Korematsu
and the other amici who filed briefs in the enemy combatant cases).

62.

Id. at 177.

63.

See Mark P. Denbeaux & Jonathan Hafetz, Introduction, in THE
GUANTÁNAMO LAWYERS: INSIDE A PRISON OUTSIDE THE LAW 1–6 (Mark
P. Denbeaux & Jonathan Hafetz eds., 2009) (describing generally the
formation of the Guantánamo Bar Association and its purpose).

64.

See Guantánamo: A Life Sentence of Suffering and Stigmatization,
AMNESTY INT’L (Feb. 3, 2006), http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-andupdates/feature-stories/guantanamo-a-life-sentence-of-suffering-andstigmatization-20060203.

65.

See P. Sabin Willett, Who’s at Guantánamo Anyway?, in THE
GUANTÁNAMO LAWYERS: INSIDE A PRISON OUTSIDE THE LAW, supra note
63, at 7–8 (describing various examples of bureaucratic incompetence).

66.

See Guantánamo Bay Naval Base (Cuba), N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2013),
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/national/usstatesterritoriesandposs
essions/guantanamobaynavalbasecuba/index.html.
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Act of 2006, 67 and to ultimately secure a constitutional right to
habeas corpus grounded in the Suspension Clause in 2008 in
Boumediene v. Bush. 68
The year 2008 was a heady one for the Guantanamo Bar
Association. Following the Boumediene decision, lawyers were having
considerable success in litigating their habeas petitions in the district
courts: district courts were imposing some substantive law-of-warbased limitations on a previously unconstrained executive detention
authority; they were carefully identifying and dismissing evidence
procured by torture; and they were rejecting evidence based on
hearsay or other attenuated evidentiary principles advanced by the
Bush Administration. 69 President Obama’s election promised the
eventual closure of the facility. 70 These seemed to represent a twin
victory for the rule of law and a dramatic vindication of CCR’s
decision to bring these challenges six years earlier.
Instead, in Goldsmith’s telling, this decision produced unintended
and paradoxical consequences. Obama abandoned his promise, made
on the first day in office, to close Guantanamo within one year and to
try 9/11 conspirators in an Article III court, and his administration
aggressively defended a broad detention authority and the validity of
every single detention decision made by the prior administration in
the habeas cases percolating in the D.C. federal courts. 71 At the same
time, the highly conservative D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, which
had been thrice reversed by the Supreme Court for ratifying the
executive branch’s position in detainee cases (Rasul, Hamdan,
Boumediene), kicked into action, steadily reversing every single
habeas grant by a district court (at the same time it affirmed nearly
every habeas denial). 72 Far from a model of accountability, the D.C.
Circuit is acting in fairly open defiance of the Supreme Court’s
Boumediene decision, mocking Boumediene’s “airy suppositions,”
reversing factual findings traditionally reserved for district courts,
offering the executive branch enormously expansive detention
authority under the Authorization for the Use of Military Force
(AUMF) and the laws of war (even hinting at the inapplicability of
67.

See Denebeaux & Hafetz, supra note 63, at 3 (noting congressional
attempts to eliminate the writ).

68.

See Mark C. Fleming, Boumediene v. Bush: The Death Knell for
Prisons Beyond the Law, in THE GUANTÁNAMO LAWYERS: INSIDE A
PRISON OUTSIDE THE LAW, supra note 63, at 219.

69.

See Baher Azmy, A Return to the Writ: Executive Detention,
Boumediene, and the New Common Law of Habeas, 95 IOWA L. REV.
445, 531–33 (2009).

70.

See Denbeaux & Hafetz, supra note 63, at 4.

71.

See GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 190–94.

72.

See Azmy, supra note 69, at 512.
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any international law constraints on executive conduct) and simply
ratifying every executive detention decision, no matter how
attenuated or contemptible. 73 Despite Boumediene’s judgment, we
find ourselves still in a pre-Boumediene world where, as Judge Tatel
described, “the court calls the game in the government’s favor.” 74
CCR President Michael Ratner believes the campaign that started
in 2002 led to many victorious battles, including “getting six or seven
hundred men out of Guantanamo” and “tak[ing] on . . . the most
egregious aspects of . . . the national security state since 9/11, and
mak[ing] them public debating issues.” 75 But Ratner regrets that he
“lost” on some basic questions like “the enemy combatant issue . . .
the preventive detention issue . . . and the military commission issue,
more or less.” 76
Goldsmith does not find this aspect of the litigation disappointing
as I do and as Ratner does, just ironic (and in a good way); 77 what
started as a “radical” challenge to military paradigm of indefinite
preventive detention ended up actually “legitimating” this system, via
“consensus legal infrastructure.” All three branches of government
(and the public) have accepted, ten years hence, the language and
logic of a wartime approach to counterterrorism. Indeed, the
detention cases themselves have broad reaching effects: they provided
a corpus of law regarding who is detainable under the AUMF78 that
grounded the administration’s targeting decisions in some semblance
of law. Goldsmith concludes his deterministic historical analysis as
follows:
[F]or those who believe that the terrorist threat remains real
and scary, and that the nation needs a Commander in Chief
empowered to meet the threat in unusual ways—embedding the
presidential prerogatives in the rule of law is an enormous

73.

See id. at 512–14.

74.

Latif v. Obama, 666 F.3d 746, 779 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Tatel, J.,
dissenting).

75.

GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 195.

76.

Id.

77.

Which is nothing to say of the dramatic successes of the litigation—
reuniting hundreds of detainees with their families, organizing the bar
and the public to recognize the unlawful arrogation of power by the
president and his military officials, changing the dishonest narrative
about the supposed dangerousness of these detainees, and exposing
torture and incompetence in the basic administration of U.S. detention
policy.

78.

S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong. (2001).
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blessing. It is a blessing, ironically, for which the nation has
Michael Ratner and his colleagues to thank. 79

This observation, though somewhat true and somewhat tart, does
not to my mind fully capture the complexity, instability, or fairness of
the post-9/11 legal landscape. Having attempted to suggest the ways
in which the component parts of Goldsmith’s synopticon (journalists,
watchdogs, lawyers, and courts) may not be as piercing as he believes,
I now offer a slightly deeper critique.

III. An Unstable Theory of Legitimacy
Goldsmith’s normative analysis—that the current national
security landscape is objectively “legitimate”—is built on a shaky
foundation. His methodological basis for arriving at this judgment
leads to premature or ill-founded conclusions. While Goldsmith and I
can agree that the presidency has been made accountable in some
ways, we should recognize the numerous other ways in which it
remains deeply unaccountable. I fear it is not just Goldsmith’s
admirable optimism about American institutions, but perhaps also his
investiture and defense of our now sprawling national security
apparatus, which causes him to unfairly privilege one form of
accountability over other, more consequential forms.
Goldsmith believes the work of human rights NGOs and other
pieces of his accountability synopticon have left “no doubt that
[current detention and targeting] practices are lawful and legitimate
within the American constitutional system.” 80 He believes we have
reached an equilibrium of power and constraint whose “legitimacy”
should make us pleased with the present state of affairs. Much of this
is unexplained, though he does state in the penultimate chapter:
[A]mong politicians, judges, and most of the American people,
there is agreement on the legitimacy of and basic constraints on
these [detention, targeting and military commission] powers,
especially compared to the 2001–2004 baseline. This
equilibrium—and the legal and political settlement that
undergirds it—is the main reason Obama continued so many
Bush counterterrorism policies as they stood in 2009. The same
legal and political pressures that influenced the evolution of
Bush’s policies continued to influence the development of
Obama’s policies, though in different ways. 81

79.

GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 196.

80.

Id. at 194 (emphasis added).

81.

Id. at 210.
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Thus, it appears the legitimation of the current legal landscape
has three primary sources: (1) the Obama Administration’s continued
use of Bush Administration policies; (2) public support; and (3)
judicial ratification.
Before proceeding to contest each component of his legitimacy
matrix, I pause to note a deep conceptual flaw shared by all of them:
an “is-ought” conflation appears particularly prominently in this part
of Goldsmith’s analysis. Goldsmith’s theory of legitimacy has a law
and economics feel to it; it operates as a variation of an efficient
market hypothesis. Under his view, it appears, we have reached a
present and optimal state of social-political-legal affairs because a set
of efficient (yet invisible) inputs, information, and dynamic
relationships pushed us inevitably to this point. The price is right.
But this sort of self-fulfilling determinism cannot be taken at face
value—one must always identify a credible dynamic that could
produce an efficient or legitimate outcome. In a fully competitive
market, it is the price mechanism which produces efficiency and
legitimacy, by transparently matching buyers and sellers at an
optimal intersection of supply and demand. Where is the parallel
mechanism driving the U.S. national security policy to a legitimate
place? That is left largely unexplored.
I have already tried to identify how a number of the inputs
(checks) are likely not as robust as Goldsmith believes and that,
therefore, may not be pushing us to the efficient (legitimate)
equilibrium of power versus constraint. I now briefly address each of
the three principle bases upon which Goldsmith believes the current
landscape is based in order to demonstrate they cannot plausibly
support a normative claim of legitimacy.
A.

The Obama Administration

Goldsmith is right, of course, that the Obama Administration,
while affirming the rejection of some of the grossest excesses of first
Bush Administration policy (torture, secret CIA prisons,
extraordinary rendition to torture, most of which were actually
abandoned prior to 200982) has maintained central features of the
Bush Administration’s detention, trial, and targeting practices as well
as its analytical foundation. Goldsmith posits that one reason these
controversial policies have continued—despite Obama’s withering
criticism of them as a candidate—is that they have been repeatedly
vetted, analyzed, and ultimately accepted by lawyers within the
administration. 83 This may be true; but, there is just no way to be
82.

We cannot actually confirm that none of these practices have continued
in any form. If it turns out not to be true, we would have to conclude
the synopticon is not working according to plan.

83.

GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 38.
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sure. In this political environment it seems risky to ascribe some
underlying correctness to Obama’s policies; that is, to assume he is
following them because he genuinely believes they are the right or
legal thing to do. This account does not sufficiently account for
politics or contingencies.
As for closing Guantanamo, trying detainees in Article III courts,
and releasing many others, principle seems to have little to do with it.
Grandstanding NIMBY politicians (in both Democratic and
Republican administrations) rejected and sensationalized Obama’s
attempt to relocate concededly innocent Uigher detainees in northern
Virginia. 84 Had Americans seen these men, living among them in
peace, holding down jobs (and criticizing the Chinese Communist
government 85), we could have recast the entire debate about the
supposed lethality of detainees in Guantanamo. Instead, some have
been disbursed to Bermuda, Palau, El Salvador, and others, equally
innocent, sit out their eleventh year there. 86 The same holds true for
the bizarre, fright-filled reaction to Attorney General Eric Holder’s
proposal to try 9/11 conspirators in the Southern District of New
York, the safest courthouse in the country. 87 As with the failure to
relocate and humanize numerous harmless detainees, the decision to
try 9/11 conspirators in military commissions instead of real courts is
attributable to politics, not law.
Why didn’t Obama do more to press his earlier principles?
Goldsmith presumably believes the University of Chicago
constitutional law professor was persuaded on the merits to abandon
them. But likely he simply had other priorities, including mustering
political attention and support for massive health care legislation and
a sustained response to financial catastrophe. If one believes Daniel
Klaidman’s account in Kill or Capture, the politicos in the Obama
84.

See Amy Gardner, Candidates Cautious or Concerned About Possible
Relocation of Detainees to Va., WASH. POST, May 15, 2009, http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/14/AR200
9051404098.html.

85.

See Peter Spiegel & Barbara Demick, Uighur Detainees at Guantanamo
Pose a Problem for Obama, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2009, http://articles
.latimes.com/2009/feb/18/world/fg-uighurs-gitmo18 (noting the
difficulty of dealing with Uighur ethnic minorities who wish to gain
independence from China).
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Jake Tapper, First Gitmo Detainees in More Than a Year Transferred;
Uighur Detainees Bound for El Salvador, ABC (Apr. 20, 2012),
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/04/first-gitmo-detainees-inmore-than-a-year-transferred/.

87.

See Carrie Johnson, For Holder, Much Wrestling Over Decision, WASH.
POST, Nov. 14, 2009, at A01 (noting the U.S. Marshals Service’s
determination that the Southern District of New York is the safest
courthouse in the country).
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Administration such as Rahm Emmanuel and David Axelrod, believed
it would be political suicide to press ahead with plans to persuade the
public to close Guantanamo, screamed down the voices of conscience
in the administration, including White House Counsel Greg Craig who
left in defeat, and ultimately prevailed on a deeply ambivalent
president. 88 All of this suggests that the merits of legal principle were
not necessarily at play in these judgments; if this much is true, then it
would seem possible that Obama could shift course in his second term
to secure a legacy consistent with his original human rights and
constitutional law instincts and thus destabilize the regime Goldsmith
believes currently to be legitimate.
Or, take another example: Why did Obama choose not to
prosecute CIA officials responsible for torture and homicide? Perhaps
he felt they had sufficient legal authority to act, or that the public
would not support selling out his predecessors. Jane Mayer suggests a
far less principled reason. According to one of her high-level
administration sources, Obama was told in no uncertain terms that
the worst thing an inexperienced (and especially Democratic)
president could ever do in the beginning of his term is turn against
the CIA; the agency would, in turn, undermine him thoroughly. 89 The
fear of losing the CIA must also explain the Obama Administration’s
decision to re-assert a full-throated state secrets defense in the
Mohamed v. Jeppeson 90 torture and extraordinary rendition case in
the Ninth Circuit, one month into office, despite the clearest
indications that he would abandon this beloved CIA defense. 91 Again,
fear, not principled study of the law, appears to be driving much of
the power-constraint equilibrium. 92
Alternatively (or in addition), Obama’s decision to abandon his
prior commitments may have to do with the very imperial vortex of
the office of the presidency and the echo chamber of national security
obsession in which it must operate. Consider Woodrow Wilson. Like
Obama, he was a progressive constitutional law scholar before

88.

See generally DANIEL KLAIDMAN, KILL OR CAPTURE (2012).

89.

See Jane Mayer, Ask Jane Mayer Anything: Should Bush Officials Be
Tried For War Crimes?, THE DAILY BEAST (July 23, 2012),
http://andrewsullivan.thedailybeast.com/2012/07/ask-jane-mayeranything-should-the-bush-administration-be-tried-for-war-crimes.html.

90.

Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010).

91.

Id. at 1083–84

92.

A fear that the CIA will go rogue has permeated virtually every
presidential administration since Eisenhower. See WEINER, supra note 3.
The nearly sovereign status of this secret agency, destabilizing as it can
be to any president’s foreign policy, surely demands more scrutiny and
accountability than currently exists.
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assuming the office of the president. 93 As president and professor at
Princeton University, Wilson wrote eloquently and thoughtfully about
the importance of robust First Amendment protections for dissident
viewpoints. 94 Yet, when he became president, he presided over the
passage of the Espionage Act of 1917 and the Sedition Act of 1918,
and the criminal prosecution of dozens of peaceful war objectors and
dissidents who he blithely considered destabilizing enemies of the
state, producing one of the most repressive periods in American
history. 95 His dramatic change of course was likely not due to a
principled or legitimate change of legal heart, and his policies were
ratified by his Attorney General, Congress, and the courts (including,
until it changed course, the Supreme Court). Under Goldsmith’s
analysis, therefore, this multi-year and repressive stasis, even though
ultimately discredited, would have maintained legal legitimacy.
B. Public Opinion

It is always fraught to consider public opinion as a measure of the
normative legitimacy of a complex legal or policy question. What do
Americans make of Planned Parenthood v. Casey? 96 Or our
jurisprudential compromises around the death penalty? Public opinion
is notoriously fickle and often based on vague impressions or the
framing of polling questions rather than on objective evidence.
Consistent polling actually suggests a majority of Americans are
uncomfortable with the more far-reaching provisions of the Bill of
Rights. 97 Much of the backlash against transferring individuals to the
United States or trying individuals here (or even transferring cleared
detainees to their home countries) is ultimately based on the most
fatuous and cynical political posturing by Congress that it is difficult
for polling to reflect. Still, Goldsmith is surely right in his gestalt
judgment that there is no widespread disapproval of Obama’s
detention and targeting policies, and none approaching the
disapprobation of Bush Administration practices, tied up as they
were with impressions of venality (Cheney-Rumsfeld-Yoo) and
incompetence (Iraq, Katrina).
93.

See Jill Lepore, A Good Bad Guy, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2010/10/10/hating-woodrowwilson/why-woodrow-wilson-makes-a-good-bad-guy.

94.

GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES 145–46 (2004).

95.

See id. at 135–60.

96.

505 U.S. 833 (1992).

97.

See Steve Chapman, The Candidates vs. the Bill of Rights, TOWNHALL
(Aug. 23, 2012), http://townhall.com/columnists/stevechapman/2012
/08/23/the_candidates_vs_the_bill_of_rights/page/full/ (suggesting
that Americans do not always favor complete religious freedom or the
full scope of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments).
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But where does this gestalt judgment get us? It does not follow
that people have consciously accepted the legality of Obama’s
practices. Apathy and disinterest seem the norm. The economy is a
mess, and people have already been talking about Guantanamo for
ten years. The managing attorney of CCR’s Guantanamo docket
recounts being asked, in 2010, by an otherwise educated and wellinformed individual, “But, I thought Obama already closed
Guantanamo?” Apathy, more than acceptance, is the norm.
Goldsmith identifies another dynamic at work: a reverse Nixongoes-to-China. If Obama, burdened with the expectations that
Democrats are soft on national security, plays against this type and
keeps open the prison and assassinates multiple people he says are
part of enemy forces, people will more likely trust this decision as
deliberative and based on legitimate concerns. This suggests public
approval is just a vague, impressionistic presumption, and not an
informed or meaningful reflection of what the state of the law ought
to be. 98
More importantly, even if there were widespread approval, what
would that mean for our system of legitimacy? Presumably there was
widespread approval for the FDR’s decision to intern Japanese and
the Court’s ratification of that decision under the Constitution—a
then-legitimate state of affairs that we shudder to think about today.
C.

The Courts

1. Detention

Goldsmith emphasizes the Supreme Court’s interventions in
Rasul, Hamdi, Hamdan, and ultimately Boumediene, both cabined the
excesses of early Bush Administration policies (torture, secret prisons,
incommunicado detention, deliberate evasion of the courts) and
solidified the current legal equilibrium: the same decisions, by
ratifying policies regarding preventive detention and targeting,
contributed to their current legitimacy. Goldsmith is particularly fond
of the legitimacy paradox as articulated by Justice Kennedy’s opinion
in Boumediene, that judicial review does not weaken the presidency,

98.

Probably very few of the public know that nearly half of the current
detainees in Guantanamo have been “cleared for release” by a
comprehensive Inter-Agency Task Force, and that therefore, all relevant
national security agencies have concluded that they aren’t dangerous
and should no longer be detained. I should think if the public did know
this troubling state of affairs, they would be far less likely to think our
current detention practices are legitimate. And, if the public still did
think accept this as fair, public opinion should not be given much
weight in an analysis of a policy’s legitimacy.
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it strengthens it: According to Kennedy, “the exercise of those powers
is vindicated, not eroded, when confirmed by the Judicial Branch.” 99
As a general matter, it is hard to see how Goldsmith can so easily
accept the idea that judicial intervention provides a legitimating role
in light of the public disapproval of judicial decisions such as Brown
v. Board of Education 100 (in the South), Roe v. Wade, 101 or Kelo v.
New London. 102 More specifically, Goldsmith’s account suffers here
from the is-ought conflation: an assumption that the level of judicial
intervention as it is today, constitutes proof that it should be this
way. There are strong reasons to question whether we have arrived at
an equilibrium and that the present state of judicial review of
detention and interrogation operations is insufficiently robust and
legitimate.
As an initial matter, Goldsmith’s deterministic view of the present
state of judicial review, and its attendant legitimacy, appears
insufficiently appreciative of pure fortuity. For example, the account
proceeds largely as if the Supreme Court’s intervention in Boumediene
(and Kennedy’s statement about the judicial ratification of executive
power) was inevitable. Far from it. Recall that the Supreme Court
actually denied the Boumediene and Al-Odah cert petitions in 2007, 103
leaving Guantanamo detainees and the executive branch under the
Detainee Treatment Act (DTA)-Military Commissions Act regime
ratified by the D.C. Circuit, without any habeas review of the legality
of their detentions. Under that DTA-based judicial-review regime, the
Suspension Clause did not apply to Guantanamo, and the only
inquiry left for the judiciary was the preposterously narrow one of
whether the military in fact followed its own procedures in
implementing the administrative Combatant Status Review Tribunal
(CSRT) proceedings. There would be no opportunity to offer
independent evidence of innocence, to challenge scope of detention
authority, or to even demand release in the unlikely event a detainee
prevailed under this DTA construct. Presumably, had the Supreme
Court not granted the petitioners’ motion to reconsider its earlier cert
denial—a contingency so remote we easily forget it happened—
Goldsmith would still endorse the D.C. Circuit’s limited DTA-based
judicial review scheme, as a fair and legitimate balance of executive
power and (limited) judicial constraint on that power.

99.

GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 194 (quoting Boumediene v. Bush, 553
U.S. 723, 797 (2008)).

100. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
101. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
102. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
103. See Boumediene v. Bush, 549 U.S. 1328 (2007).
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Instead, petitioners’ counsel, through a series of high-wire
coincidences, located Stephen Abraham, a California lawyer and
former Naval Intelligence officer who had been involved in a number
of CSRT panels, and who was willing to blow the whistle at that
moment in time, via declaration to the Court and congressional
testimony about how laughably one-sided and outcome-determinative
the CSRT process was. 104 It was proof that the kind of broad
deference to the CSRT process endorsed by the D.C. Circuit could
not operate as an adequate substitute to even the most elementary
requirements of habeas corpus and must have convinced the Supreme
Court that it need not wait to see how the D.C. Circuit regime shook
out. The system Goldsmith imagines generally works rationally and
predictably to produce democratically accountable and legitimate
outcomes. So, what if the Boumediene and Al-Odah petitioners’
counsel had never been able to find Stephen Abraham’s silver bullet
in time to file a motion to reconsider with the Court? Presumably,
Goldsmith would still consider the alternate, weaker system to
represent the best of all possible worlds.
But, we did get Boumediene and an order from the High Court
that each detainee be provided a “meaningful” opportunity to
challenge the legal and factual basis of their detention, without any of
the presumptive deference Congress and the D.C. Circuit sought to
give the military’s CSRT determinations regarding detainability. 105 It
was a result the Guantanamo Bar Association cheered at the time, as
a capstone of a long, hard struggle for genuine accountability in
Guantanamo. As I’ve written elsewhere, 106 Boumediene in fact
produced accountability in the district courts, as those habeas courts
were finally empowered to, among other things, including limit the
president’s otherwise utterly unconstrained AUMF and law-of-war
detention authority, throw out government evidence that was
procured by torture and coercion, and carefully scrutinize the
plausibility of otherwise highly attenuated guilt-by-association
theories proposed by the government. In the early months following
Boumediene, and consistent with what the Guantanamo Bar had long
argued was the unfairness of so many of the Guantanamo detentions,
detainees were successful in a significant majority of their habeas
petitions in the district courts. 107
104. See Gitmo Panelist Slams Hearing Process, CBS (Feb. 11, 2009), htt
p://www.cbsnews.com/2100-202_162-2970288-2.html?pageNum=1.
105. See Boumediene v. Bush, 552 U.S. 723, 779–81 (2008).
106. See, e.g., Azmy, supra note 69.
107. See Linda Greenhouse, Goodbye to Gitmo, N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2012),
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/16/goodbye-to-gitmo
(stating that during the first two years after Boumediene, district courts
granted habeas corpus in nineteen out of thirty-four cases)
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Goldsmith’s is one version of a legitimate and accountable
separation-of-powers regime, which preserves a meaningful role for the
courts in a manner consistent with Boumediene’s instructions and the
historic scope of the great writ. But, importantly it is decidedly not
the one we have now. Sitting in open defiance of the Supreme Court’s
Boumediene decision, the D.C. Circuit has eviscerated the prospect of
meaningful judicial scrutiny by the district courts of the president’s
detention decisions. The D.C. Circuit has reversed every district court
decision granting the writ and affirmed nearly every decision denying
the writ. The D.C. Circuit has purposefully ensured that the president
has complete discretion to detain, via decisions that: (1) reverse
careful fact-finding of the district courts, in favor of its own
assessments of credibility and plausibility of evidence;108 (2) accept the
facial validity of government evidence, no matter how dated, raw, or
contestable; 109 (3) reject the relevance of international law to interpret
detention authority, in a manner contravening the Supreme Court’s
plurality opinion in Hamdi; 110 and (4) prohibit district courts from
entering orders requiring the executive to release non-detainable
petitioners, preferring supine orders that merely encourage the
executive to undertake its best efforts to find a detainee a home. 111 As
Judge Tatel observed in his dissent in Latif, the D.C. Circuit’s
jurisprudence comes perilously close to accepting what the
government says as true. 112 Indeed, the D.C. Circuit has effectively
reinstated its 2007 Boumediene/Al-Odah jurisprudence of categorical
deference; now in 2012, it is as if Boumediene had never been decided.
And, if the Court’s decision in Boumediene was necessary to preserve
legitimacy of our system, what does Goldsmith make of the fact that
the D.C. Circuit has since effectively overruled it?
In sum, for Guantanamo detentions, the writ no longer exists as a
mechanism of accountability. It is impossible then, to agree with
Goldsmith’s belief that the current state of judicial constraint on
executive detention power is optimal.
2. Targeting

Lessons about the judiciary’s role in reviewing targeting decisions
are equally inconclusive. In 2010, CCR and the ACLU sought an
injunction to prevent the extrajudicial killing of Anwar al-Aulaqi, a
108. See generally Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102 (2010) (overturning a
district court’s factual finding that detainee was not a member of alQaeda).
109. See Latif v. Obama, 666 F.3d 746, 748–49 (2011).
110. See Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 871 (2010).
111. See Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 1026 (2009).
112. See Latif, 666 F.3d at 779 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
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U.S. citizen residing in Yemen (i.e., far from a zone of actual armed
conflict), after it was reported that al-Aulaqi had been placed on an
executive “kill list.” 113 District Court Judge John Bates took the
questions raised by the suit seriously, but ultimately dismissed the
case on the grounds that the plaintiff, Anwar al-Aulaqi’s father,
lacked standing to proceed on behalf of his son and that, in any event,
the decision to target an individual for killing whom the president
himself believes is an enemy is constitutionally committed to the
executive branch under the political question doctrine. 114 CCR and
the ACLU have since filed another suit, challenging the legality of the
eventual killing of Anwar al-Aulaqi, plus the killings of U.S. citizen
Samir Khan (whose killing was “collateral” to the targeted killing of
al-Aulaqi) and Abdul-Rahman al-Aulaqi, the sixteen-year-old U.S.
citizen-son of Anwar al-Aulaqi, who was killed in a massive drone
strike two weeks later, without legitimate lawful or factual basis. 115
Goldsmith no doubt predicts that this latest suit will be dismissed
on the political question doctrine, or Bivens special factors, 116 or
perhaps qualified immunity. He may be right, especially considering
the overly-deferential state of D.C. Circuit law in the national
security context. Dismissal on any one of these technical doctrines of
judicial restraint, however, would not legitimate the legality of the
decision to kill individuals without due process, any more than a
court’s dismissal of murder charges under a statute of limitations
would legitimate the underlying crime. The process of legitimation is
dynamic and cannot be fixed with any one judicial determination.
And, as Goldsmith rightly appreciates, this lawsuit is but one piece of
advocacy and pressure by the “international legal-media-academicNGO-international organization-global opinion complex,” to
“stigmatize drones and those who support and operate them.” 117
D.

A Revealing Bias

I have already suggested that Goldsmith tends toward the
optimistic in his assessment of the legitimacy of the present legalpolitical landscape and that it is hard to otherwise credit his
confidence that the current state of the world is an optimal one. My
skepticism of Goldsmith’s position is compounded considerably by a
113. See CCR and the ACLU v. OFAC & Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, CTR. FOR
CONST. RTS., http://www.ccrjustice.org/Al-Aulaqi-v-Obama+ (last
visited Feb. 16, 2013).
114. See id.
115. Complaint, Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, No. 12-cv-01192 (D.D.C. July 18,
2012), available at http://ccrjustice.org/targetedkillings.
116. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of
Investigaton, 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971).
117. GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 200 (quoting Professor Kenneth Anderson).
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persistent and serious factual error in his analysis that reveals an
unjustified bias in favor of the status quo.
Goldsmith credulously labels the detainees remaining in
Guantanamo (numbering 166 by this writing) as “terrorist soldiers,”
when the overwhelming majority are neither terrorists nor soldiers.118
He also speculates without citation to authority that the remaining
detainees are by now truly the “worst of the worst” that Rumsfeld
falsely assured us were housed in Guantanamo in 2002. This is flatly
incorrect. For example, at the time of the book’s publication, four
remaining detainees were Uighers, who the Bush Administration and
the courts concluded were not terrorists or soldiers or otherwise
detainable. 119 Indeed, by this writing 86 of the 166 detainees—i.e.,
over half of the remaining population—have been “cleared for
transfer” by a rigorous inter-agency task force set up by the Obama
Administration in his first year in office; this designation means that
the relevant agencies (State Department, DHS, CIA, DOD, NSA, and
NIA) have unanimously concluded that a detainee is not a threat to
the United States or its allies and thus should be transferred to their
home countries or resettled in a third country. 120 These 86 men are
decidedly not the worst of the worst; they remain in Guantanamo,
despite the jailers’ determination that they should go free, only
because of political timidity by the Obama Administration and
substantively unjust restrictions on transferring detainees out of
Guantanamo imposed by a craven Congress—restrictions that keep
Guantanamo open and unaccountable, and we should hasten to add,
Congress never saw fit to impose on the Bush Administration.
This is more than a small oversight. It is revealing of Goldsmith’s
predispositions. It is much easier to defend the status quo if one
ignores its unambiguous injustices. By simply guessing that those who
remain must be the really dangerous, Goldsmith reveals that he
believes the system (including the process that has sorted who could
go home and who must remain) works rationally and moves linearly
toward progress. In fact, the system governing the Guantanamo
118. See Guantánamo by the Numbers, supra note 7 (showing that a majority
of the detainees remaining in Guantanamo have been cleared for
release).
119. See Two Uighurs Get a Fresh Start in El Salvador, WASH. POST, Apr.
26, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/two-uighurs-get-afresh-start-in-el-salvador/2012/04/26/gIQA9oI0jT_story.html.
120. Obama Releases Names of Cleared Guantánamo Prisoners; Now It’s
Time to Set Them Free, ANDY WORTHINGTON (Sept. 9, 2012),
http://www.andyworthington.co.uk/2012/09/29/obama-releases-namesof-cleared-guantanamo-prisoners-now-its-time-to-set-them-free/ (stating
that eighty-six Guantanamo prisoners have been cleared for release by
Obama’s Guantanamo Review Task Force); Guantánamo by the
Numbers, supra note 7.
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detentions, ten years into its creation, is astonishingly arbitrary, cruel
and, ultimately, substantively illegitimate.

IV. A Thin Theory of Accountability
So far, I have addressed the claim that each component of
Goldsmith’s synopticon can keep meaningful watch on the executive’s
national security practices and the corollary that the surveillance and
pressure of these inputs have produced a set of policies (e.g.,
detention, military commissions, and targeting) that are stable and
endorsed as legitimate by the public and constitutional agents (the
president, Congress, the courts). I now wish to briefly address
Goldsmith’s ultimate claim that the president is and will remain
sufficiently accountable to the American people, courts, and Congress,
even as we proceed through an era of indefinite war. Goldsmith
concedes that the mechanisms of accountability he identifies are quite
different than those contemplated by James Madison to do the
checking and balancing in our constitutional system, especially since
Madison would no doubt be quite alarmed by the size and
adventurousness of our modern, military presidency. Still, Goldsmith
concludes:
[A]fter adjusting to the modern world and studying the vitriolic
clashes of the last decade between the presidency and its
synopticon, Madison would discover a harmonious system of
mutual frustration undergirding a surprising national
consensus—a consensus always fruitfully under pressure from
various quarters—about the proper scope of the President’s
counter-terrorism authorities. And, then the father of the
Constitution would smile. 121

That James Madison would, or anyone else should, accept the
system of accountability Goldsmith describes, seems overly optimistic.
Or, more to the point, enthusiasm for it depends on adopting in the
first instance, a standard of accountability insufficiently rigorous for a
healthy constitutional republic.
A.

Defining Accountability Down

Toward the end of his book, Goldsmith offers his definition of
accountability: “to be subject to an account, which in turn means to
disclose one’s activities, explain and answer for them, and subject
oneself to the consequences of the institution to which one is
accounting.” 122 As Goldsmith concedes, his definition need not include
other traditional forms of accountability for wrongdoing such as
121. GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 243.
122. Id. at 234–35.
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criminal liability or, as I will discuss later, civil liability. This is
accountability as process, rather than as substance. It credits a
government entity’s disclosure of information for assessment by
political actors (especially where the disclosure imposes administrative
oversight burdens), even if no negative consequences attend to those
who undertook unlawful activity. It is hard to see how mere
investigations will ever provide adequate deterrence. I believe a
legitimate system of separation of powers must insist on a higher
standard of accountability.
Recall that Goldsmith was satisfied that two of the architects of
the CIA’s torture practices, former DOJ Office of Legal Counsel
officials John Yoo and Jay Bybee, were subject to an intensive ethics
investigation by the Department of Justice into their outcomedeterminative, executive-take-all legal opinions, even though higherlevel DOJ officials nixed the prospect of any legal sanction against the
lawyers. 123 The mere fact of an ethics investigation did not add much
to the existing consensus in the legal and political establishment
about Yoo and Bybee’s unethical lawyering. In light of that, the
decision to overturn the DOJ’s recommendation of sanction looks
little like accountability and more like the kind of impunity for highlevel officials one sees in a system that is not seriously committed to
the rule of law. Goldsmith surmises that future national security
lawyers will be more cautious in their work because of the “brutal
recriminations that Jay Bybee, John Yoo, and other lawyers suffered
as a result of legal opinions written at a time of scary threats.” 124 Note
Goldsmith’s allegiances: recriminations are “brutal,” but he says
nothing of brutality of the interrogation techniques Yoo and Bybee
authored. In any event, perhaps they take from this episode a very
different lesson. After all, Yoo and Bybee, even after enduring this
investigation, still now sit in the most elite positions of authority:
tenured professor at University of California—Berkeley and judge on
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Goldsmith also credits the Durham investigation of CIA’s
destruction of videotapes and of detainee homicides that occurred at
the hands of the CIA, even though it resulted in no criminal
prosecution or other public reprimand, because his investigation
required the agency to turn over thousands of documents, churn
through their memories, and explain their conduct; 125 this was both
unprecedented in the annals of this secrecy-obsessed entity and a pain
in their neck. This may have been better than nothing, or maybe it
was not. The absence of punitive measures will potentially signal, over
time, that these investigations are merely prophylactic and non123. See supra Section II.
124. GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 238.
125. See id. at 236–39.
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consequential. More problematic, endorsing this kind of paper review
risks fundamentally corrupting judicial processes—it becomes a sort of
show trial designed ultimately to justify policies under question,
rather than a serious attempt to judge potential crimes on the merits.
B.

High-Level Impunity

Goldsmith’s transparency-based system of political accountability
should make it more difficult for executive-branch officials to repeat
many of the same unlawful or extra-legal activities of the past. His
metric of accountability is admirably forward looking. This
perspective, however, overlooks another important component of a
meaningful system of accountability: legal liability for unlawful
conduct. One would think this kind of accountability, i.e., forcing
actors to internalize the costs of their serious misconduct, would be a
part of any “ecology of transparency,” but it is not for Goldsmith.
Accordingly, while Goldsmith largely endorses Supreme Court cases
such as Rasul, Hamdi, Hamdan, and Boumediene because they pushed
the executive to be more transparent and responsive to coordinate
branches of government, he pays no attention to a very troubling set
of cases that have ensured impunity to numerous (mostly high-level)
government officials for the most egregious of the Bush
Administration practices—torture, extraordinary rendition, and
religious discrimination. Given a widespread perception that Bush
Administration policies were fundamentally lawless, the judiciary’s
response to serious legal challenges seeking accountability (i.e., an
acknowledgement of wrongdoing) against some of the administration’s
most controversial practices represents a serious failure in our system.
The architecture of impunity constructed by the courts for the
benefit of government officials engaged in illegal conduct is especially
concerning for several reasons:
•

The Supreme Court repeatedly rejected, the theoretical
premise upon which many of these damagesaccountability detention cases were dismissed—that the
judiciary is not competent to second guess executive
decisions in wartime, or that executive officials should
have near complete discretion to act in matters related
to national security—and did so in a manner that itself
marked a conscious departure from the Court’s
regrettable World War II-era deference to the
military. 126

126. See id. at 168–170 (discussing the “longlasting shame” of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Korematsu v. United States, 324 U.S. 885 (1945)).
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•

Under this country’s Marbury paradigm, and even in
the ever-diminishing Bivens context, the remedy of
damages for government misconduct is (and should be)
still considered an important attribute of our
commitment to the rule of law and separation of
powers. 127

•

Sister nations such as Canada and the United Kingdom
have provided substantial damages awards (aided by, if
not directly compelled by, judicial decree) for their role
in abuses of some of the very same people denied relief
in U.S. courts. 128

Consider just a few examples of the judiciary’s failure to hold the
executive branch accountable.
1. Extraordinary Rendition

In the extraordinary rendition context, the Second Circuit sitting
en banc dismissed the infamous case of Maher Arar, a Canadian
citizen who sued a variety of federal government officials under
Bivens for their role in apprehending and abusing him in JFK Airport
and in rendering him to Syria through a deliberate evasion of judicial
process, where he was tortured as part of an allegedly joint SyrianU.S. interrogation plan. 129 The Canadian government acknowledged
Arar’s innocence, accepted responsibility for their role in his torture,
apologized to him, and paid him $10 million—an act of meaningful
accountability. The Second Circuit, however, concluded that a
number of “special factors,” most general among them, the national
security context in which the case arose, counseled hesitation in the

127. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (“The very
essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual
to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One
of the first duties of government is to afford that protection.”); Bivens
v. Six Unkown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 407 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (“The [government’s] arguments for a more stringent test to
govern the grant of damages in constitutional cases [than that governing
a grant of equitable relief] seem to be adequately answered by the point
that the judiciary has a particular responsibility to assure the
vindication of constitutional interests. . . .”).
128. See, e.g., Philip Bentley, QC & David Henry, UK Competition Court
Awards Punitive Damages for the First Time, MCDERMOTT, WILL &
EMERY (July 9, 2012), http://www.mwe.com/UK-Competition-CourtAwards-Punitive-Damages-For-the-First-Time-07-09-2012/?Publication
Types=d9093adb-e95d-4f19-819a-f0bb5170ab6d (noting that UK law
provides “exemplary damages” for instances of “oppressive, arbitrary or
unconstitutional conduct by ‘servants of the government’”).
129. See Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 565–67 (2d Cir. 2009).
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creation of a Bivens damage remedy for Arar. 130 Most significant, the
majority ultimately viewed Arar’s suit, though styled as an
individual-damages action against high-level government officials, as a
challenge to a long-standing executive policy of extraordinary
rendition. 131 This is a curious but revealing objection because these
concerns would apply to any civil rights action—almost all of which
use the damage remedy to affect “government interests” and, if
moderately successful, “elicit government funds for settlement.” 132
And, that a civil rights action might influence the unlawful
implementation of a government policy can hardly be a reason to
“counsel hesitation” in its creation because, as Judge Sack
understated, “that is their point.” 133 Civil rights actions, as in any
healthy tort system, are designed to “make it more costly for
executive officers to violate the Constitution.” 134 That a court is
unwilling to constrain the executive’s ability to violate the
constitution should be seen as a serious defect in a system of
accountability.
In El-Masri v. Tenet 135 and Mohamed v. Jeppesen Data Plan,136
the Fourth Circuit and en banc Ninth Circuit ruled that the state
secrets doctrine required dismissal of rendition and torture claims on
the pleadings, even after assuming that the plaintiffs could prove all
facts necessary to prevail based on already-public information. 137 Yet,
each court’s concern about an unacceptable risk of disclosure of
classified information appears at tension with the judiciary’s notable
success in the detention context, of meeting and managing that same
concern. In notable contrast, the European Court of Human Rights
found the Macedonian government acted unlawfully in conspiring
with U.S. officials to effectuate El-Masri’s rendition, and ordered
payment of damages to El-Masri, 138 while the British government
paid Mohamed and other British citizens millions of dollars in
compensation for the British government’s role in the rendition,
130. See id. at 573.
131. See id. at 574 (“Such a suit unavoidably influences government policy,
probes government secrets, invades government interests, enmeshes
government lawyers, and thereby elicits government funds for
settlement.”).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 602–03 (Sack, J., dissenting).
134. Id. (citing Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992)).
135. 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2005).
136. 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
137. El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 299–300; Mohamed, 614 F.3d at 1073.
138. El-Masri v. Macedonia, No. 39630-09, Judgment, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Dec. 12
2012).
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unlawful detention and torture at the hands of the Americans. 139
And, more problematic for Goldsmith’s theory, the decisions
demonstrate that the judiciary is not particularly interested in forcing
transparency among coordinate branches of government and thus is
not advancing the limited theory of accountability Goldsmith
proposes.
2. Torture

In the torture context, in Rasul v. Myers, 140 the D.C. Circuit ruled
that government officials allegedly responsible for the torture and
abuse of Guantanamo detainees were entitled to qualified immunity
because an alien’s constitutional right to be free from torture and
abuse outside the territorial United States was not “clearly
established,” and because military personnel alleged to have engaged
in torture were acting “within the scope of their employment.” 141 The
per curium opinion all but stated that prisoner abuse is a routine and
sometimes necessary part of warfare. This seems like a form of judicial
approbation of extra-legal conduct, and not a form of judiciallyimposed accountability. 142 Even Jose Padilla, who unlike Shafiq Rasul,
was a U.S. citizen, brutally and systematically tortured for period of
months on U.S. soil, would not be entitled to receive even one dollar
in nominal damages from government officials, because the existence
of “special factors,” such as potentially illegal policy decisions made
by government actors, precluded the judiciary from second guessing
such decisions. As appellate counsel for Mr. Padilla and a protagonist
in Goldsmith’s book, Ben Wizner, wrote in the ACLU’s brief for Mr.
Padilla, the Fourth Circuit’s decision takes this country to the bottom
of the slippery slope. 143 Goldsmith does not attempt to account for
this remarkable abdication of the judicial role.
139. See Patrick Wintour, Guantanamo Bay Detainees to be Paid
Compensation by UK Government, THE GUARDIAN (UK), Nov. 15, 2010,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/nov/16/guantanamo-baycompensation-claim.
140. 563 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
141. Id. at 660.
142. The court also ruled in some troubling logic that these foreign-national
detainees were not a “person” within the statutory terms of the
Religious Freedom and Restoration Act and as such could not pursue
religious discrimination claims. See id. at 532–33.
143. Brief for Appellant, Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540 (4th Cir. 2012)
(No. 11-6480).
Because ‘[n]o court had specifically and definitely addressed the
rights of enemy combatants,’ the court held that Defendant’s
were not on notice that subjecting Padilla to beatings; depriving
him of sleep, heat and light; and threatening him with worse
torture and death might violate the Constitution. By this
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3. Supervisory Liability

In the supervisory liability context, the Supreme Court in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal 144 held that Attorney General John Ashcroft and
FBI Director Robert Mueller were entitled to qualified immunity from
a Bivens damages suit. 145 The Court concluded that the plaintiff’s
allegations that the officials acted with the required discriminatory
animus in creating a special hold policy for Muslim detainees were
“implausible,” particularly in light of an “obvious alternative”
explanation of valid law enforcement goals in pursuing suspected
terrorists following the calamity of 9/11. 146 The Court’s conclusion
that bias was implausible in light of a neutral wartime explanation
creeps suspiciously close to Justice Black’s implausible rejection of
charges of racism as partially motivating Japanese internment. 147 In
any event, that kind of plausibility determination would typically be
sent to a jury. But, by making the plausibility determination at the
motion-to-dismiss threshold, the Supreme Court ensured that no jury
in this case and others, exercise any hindsight bias and find, years
after-the-fact, that these government officials acted unreasonably.
Thus, the Court itself created a significant obstacle, to accountability
through the judicial system for official wrongdoing.
Though we cannot know for sure, it is fair to surmise that
Goldsmith would view these cases as fitting in nicely in his
accountability model, not least because his model appears to exclude
the forms of accountability these cases seek. Goldsmith would likely
say that these cases achieve the right results because the executive
branch should have substantial discretion in creating policies in
response to dangerous contingencies, without worrying about future
liability at a point when public opinion has shifted. He would then
likely suggest that the cases are nevertheless proof of the legitimacy of
our accountability system (narrowly defined) because it forced the
government to respond to the complaint, on the road to a judicial
endorsement of Goldsmith’s normative view of broad executive power.
extraordinary logic, Defendants could have beaten Padilla to
death and faced no liability, because ‘not court’ had ‘specifically
addressed’ the right of ‘enemy combatants’ to be free from
extrajudicial murder.
Id. at 29. See also Vance v. Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012) (en
banc) (dismissing a Bivens suit brought by a U.S. citizen against the
former Defense Secretary for authorizing interrogation techniques that
resulted in Vance’s torture while in U.S. custody in Iraq).
144. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
145. Id. at 675–76.
146. Id. at 675–76, 682.
147. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 224, 223 (1944).
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Despite what seems to me the manifest unfairness of these cases and
this doctrine, Goldsmith would presumably still think we still live in
the best of all possible national security worlds.
C.

The Tragedy of the American Form of Legitimacy

What can explain the categorical failure of the accountability
cases, at least from the perspective of individuals bringing them?
Recall that one particular peculiarity of these cases is that the very
theory of exclusive executive prerogative over detention and
interrogation these cases heartily endorse, was rejected by the
Supreme Court repeatedly in the enemy combatant cases. One
possible explanation is that these accountability cases, like much of
Goldsmith’s perspective, are grounded in a foundation of American
exceptionalism. These accountability cases are quite hostile to and
dismissive of the claims of the plaintiffs to wrest restitution from
representatives of the U.S. government. Thus, for Goldsmith and the
Supreme Court, it may be one (positive) thing for the judiciary to
make the president accountable to another branch of the U.S.
government; it is quite another (unacceptable) thing for the judiciary
to make the president accountable to foreigners or, in Goldsmith’s
shoddy but revealing parlance, “terrorist soldiers.”
Goldsmith’s primary interest is to shore up the strength and
legitimacy of the executive branch so that it will be positioned to
deter or respond to a terrorist attack. He presumably is not intensely
concerned with reconciling our past practices against international law
norms or providing restitution to those brutalized by U.S. official
conduct. And, to be fair, he seeks only to measure legitimacy within
the U.S. constitutional system. Still, it is worth broadening our
perspective of accountability and legitimacy and considering these
norms from different vantage points.
1. Victims

A system that carries out two massive wars, a global
counterterrorism operation of unprecedented scale and brutality,
including brutality even Goldsmith would acknowledge was in fact
wrong, has to acknowledge that it will impose immense costs on real
human beings, including innocent ones. Aside from the most general
lip service, and some court-martials of low-level military officers, the
U.S. government has offered no meaningful accounting, apology, or
recompense to hundreds of victims of torture, abuse, homicide, and
unlawful detention in Abu Ghraib and other Iraqi prisons. 148 While
the Canadian government offered an apology and restitution of $10
148. See, e.g., Elisabeth Bumiller & Eric Schmitt, President Sorry for Iraq
Abuse; Backs Rumsfeld, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2004, at A1 (stating that
the President failed to make an direct apology on behalf of the country
for the abuses at Abu Ghraib).
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million to Maher Arar, 149 the United States government sought and
received judicial “legitimation” of its conspiracy to render and torture
him in Syria and will not utter one word of apology or contrition to
him or his family. Human rights groups have counted many hundreds
of innocent civilians killed by U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan and
Yemen, 150 an accounting that the U.S. simply defines away or
mendaciously and arrogantly denies. 151
In his dissenting opinion in Arar v. Ashcroft, Judge Calabresi
explained what a genuinely legitimate judicial system should
recognize:
Whether extraordinary rendition is constitutionally permissible
is a question that seems to divide our country. It seems to me
obvious, however, that regardless of the propriety of such
renditions . . . mistakes will be made in its operation. And more
obvious still is that a civilized polity, when it errs, admits it and
seeks to give redress. . . . In some countries, this occurs through
a royal commission. In the United States, for better or worse,
courts are, almost universally, involved. This being so, and
regardless of whether the Constitution itself requires that there
be such redress, the object must be to create and use judicial
structures that facilitate the giving of compensation, at least to
innocent victims, while protecting from disclosure those facts
that cannot be revealed without endangering national
security. 152

This country’s inability to genuinely account for its mistakes
represents a deep moral failure. It renders our system—certainly from
the perspective of non-government actors—illegitimate.
2. History

I am not as confident that history, an admittedly ineffable
standard, will view this current equilibrium that Goldsmith describes
as legitimate or desirable. Who wouldn’t have described the
interbranch ratification of the internment of Japanese-Americans as
legitimate in 1945 and in the immediate years after? Goldsmith
consistently argues that this time around, we have done better to
avoid the worst mistakes of the World War II era (even as he seems
149. Ottawa Reaches $10M Settlement with Arar, CBC (Jan. 25, 2007),
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2007/01/25/arar-harper.html.
150. See THE CIVILIAN IMPACT OF DRONES: UNEXAMINED COSTS,
UNANSWERED QUESTIONS, CENTER FOR CIVILIANS IN CONFLICT,
COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL: HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC 19–21 (2012).
151. See Scott Shane, C.I.A. is Disputed on Civilian Toll in Drone Attacks,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2011, at A1.
152. Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 638 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
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to endorse a decision, Ex Parte Quirin, that Justice Scalia rightly
described as representing “not th[e] Court’s finest hour” 153). But I
suspect historical judgment will be less forgiving of that kind of
temporal relativism and pass a far more critical verdict than
Goldsmith registers.
3. The World

Whatever one thinks of the legitimacy of the present legal
landscape within the United States, one would be hard-pressed to find
many among the other five billion people of the world who view our
system as legitimate under any normative standard. Obama was
awarded a Nobel Peace Prize on the expectation that he would carry
through on his promise to close Guantanamo, restore the American
system of justice, and end military expansionism. 154 The policies he
has carried on are a betrayal of that expectation. Likewise, consider
Obama’s first major address to the world. It was delivered in Cairo,
the capital of the Muslim world, in his first month of office. In that
speech, he promised an end to the extra-legal practices of the Bush
Administration—torture, military detention in Guantanamo, and the
like. 155 He delivered that message there because Guantanamo had such
iconic significance in that part of the world. Since that time,
thousands of courageous Arabs in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain,
and Syria risked their lives to throw off regimes that for years relied
on torture, military detention, and related authoritarian practices—a
thrilling tribute to the irresistible pull of freedom and human rights.
Obama’s failure to live up to his promise to end the practices he
identified in his Cairo speech has, regrettably but unsurprisingly,
made the United States utterly irrelevant to this powerful freedom
movement.

V. Conclusion: A More Sinister Paradox
As I noted in the beginning of this paper, Goldsmith identifies a
paradox in CCR’s role in the post 9/11 decade: he suggests that by
choosing to take on the executive in a hail-mary challenge to
indefinite military detention in Guantanamo, CCR set in motion a
process that, while checking the worst excesses of executive power,
ultimately put core components of military detention on stronger legal
footing. In other words, CCR of all places has made the presidency
more imperial. Framed this way, the paradox has quite a sting to it.
153. Hamdi v. Rumseld, 542 U.S. 507, 570 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
154. See Editorial, The Peace Prize, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2009, at A22.
155. Text: Obama’s Speech in Cairo, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2009), http://
www.nytimes.com/2009/06/04/us/politics/04obama.text.html?pagewant
ed=all&_r=0.
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But I worry about a potentially more tragic irony coming to pass.
By contorting our constitutional traditions in order to accommodate
broad and permanent military power to detain, bomb, and capture
persons (almost exclusively Muslims) all over the world; by rendering
these practices normal and “legitimate” under U.S. law, even as they
appear universally illegitimate to the rest of the world, and thus
heightening antipathy toward the United States; to do so all in the
name of preventing another terrorist attack, actually heightens the
risk that such an attack will occur. I hope I am wrong about that
prospect. But, I also hope Goldsmith and others who wield the levers
of national security power will be mindful of the unintended
consequences of the current system of accountability they
optimistically defend.
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